Canada's New "Sorta" Space Plan Only Really Covers the Canadian Space Agency, Not "Whole of Government" Activities

          By Chuck Black

Almost a month after the March 6th, 2019 formal release of "Exploration, Imagination, Innovation - A New Space Strategy for Canada" by the governing Justin Trudeau Liberals, it's becoming increasingly obvious that the new Canadian space strategy is simply not the comprehensive "whole of government review" of activities, policies and legislation expected.

According to the February 23rd, 2015 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat website on the Whole of Government Framework, since 2005 the Treasury Board has "supported the development of a common, government-wide approach to the collection, management, and reporting of financial and non-financial information on program objectives, performance, and results." The whole-of-government framework maps "the financial and non-financial contributions of departments, agencies, and Crown corporations receiving appropriations to a set of 16 high-level Government of Canada outcome areas within four Government of Canada spending areas—Economic, Social, International, and Government Affairs." Graphic c/o Treasury Board of Canada.

At the very least, it's certainly not a long-term space plan.

It is instead a very limited listing of upcoming Canadian Space Agency (CSA) activities and priorities focused almost entirely around component contributions to the US led Lunar Gateway, a program currently in a state of flux.

It's not that there's anything wrong with that. It's simply that, after waiting for over fifteen years for something a little bit more comprehensive and perhaps a little more Canadian, we were hoping for better.

For example, the new plan doesn't really reference other space focused initiatives from other Federal government departments, such as the new Canadian Minerals and Metals Plan (CMMP), a Canadian government program last discussed in the March 4th, 2019 post, "The New Canadian Minerals and Metals Plan Stakes its Claim on the Space Industry."

The new plan doesn't really reference academia or the private sector either, except perhaps to congratulate them for their past accomplishments and to offer up a few more opportunities for funding.

The new Canadian space strategy isn't even really a self contained plan since its primary justification is as a smaller component of the Liberal’s 2017 Innovation and Skills Plan which is focused almost entirely around jobs creation.

Traditional long-term space plans, beginning with the 1967 "Chapman Report," known more formally as "Upper Atmosphere and Space Programs in Canada" by J.H. Chapman, P.A. Forsyth, P.A. Lapp and G.N. Patterson, were far larger and contained considerably more information collected from a variety of government departments.

For example, as outlined in the June 1967 Science Council of Canada overview of the 1967 Chapman report, under the title "Report No. 1, A Space Program for Canada," the 140+ page Chapman report was divided into three parts:

The first describes current and projected government, university, and industrial programs for the 1961 to 1971 period in considerable detail. Statistical information on these programs is compiled from the original sources. The comments and recommendations of the study group are included.  

The second part is devoted to the texts of agreements, memoranda of understanding, and other international arrangements in effect on October 31, 1966, and which record the official undertakings with regard to the Alouette-ISIS Scientific Program, the International Communications Satellite Program, the St. John's, Newfoundland, Tracking and Telemetry Station, and the operation of the Churchill Research Range. 

Part three of the report is in the nature of an appendix to the first part, presenting the High Altitude Research Program of McGill University in considerably greater detail. 

This was a reasonably comprehensive listing of pretty much everything the Canadian government was supporting in this area at the time.

John Chapman (1921 - 1979) and another of his legacies, the Alouette-1 satellite. As outlined in the Fall 1992 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Canadian Review post, "The 30th Anniversary of Alouette I," Chapman "was convinced of the need to develop the capability to design and build space hardware in Canadian industry and to move away from the practice of relying solely on the expertise of the government laboratories. As a result, Alouette II and the ISIS satellites were built, with steadily increasing participation by Canadian industry." Photo's c/o IEEE Canada.

But the new, twenty page Liberal space strategy is only a seventh the size of its illustrious predecessor and far less comprehensive. Once we get past the ministers message and a couple of nice full page and half page graphics, the remaining pages are divided into three sections:

A series of discussions on "Canada's Legacy in Space," including the role of space in developing Canadian science expertise and a short essay on "The Socio-Economic Benefits of Space," which covers metrics related to gross domestic revenues, employment and industry and private sector opportunities for future growth. 

An overview of "Canada's Vision for Space," focused around science and the need to utilize space focused technologies as "a key element" of the Federal Government’s 2017 Innovation and Skills Plan, focused around generating new middle class jobs in  innovative sectors. 

Several pages on "Delivering the Vision," which included $1.9Bln CDN for a next-generation AI-enabled deep-space robotic system (essentially, a new "Canadarm") for the US led Lunar Gateway program, a re-commitment to the Canadian astronaut program, substantial new educational outreach and several other programs relating to solving "everyday challenges" for Canadians.

While the new policy does mention "science," at least in passing, it certainly doesn't attempt to inventory space focused initiatives taking place across Canada through the National Research Council (NRC) or other government and private sector organizations.

Such an inventory, a standard component of the traditional "whole of government" approach to the problem is certainly not impossible to generate. A good place to start could be the Industry Page on this blog.

The lack of an inventory would suggest that the new policy is not the comprehensive, final word on Canadian space initiatives pitched by the Canadian government.

Also, while the new strategy does mention the need to "create a modern regulatory framework," it doesn't go into any detail on which specific regulations need to be addressed and updated. As outlined in both the December 14th, 2018 post, "2019 Federal Pre-Budget Consultation Report Mentions "Significant, Ongoing Investments to Advance Canada’s Space Program"" and the March 5th, 2018 post, "That Commercial Ground Station Built by New North Networks in Inuvik Still Can't be Used," specific areas requiring updated legislation have certainly presented themselves to those willing to do the appropriate research.

Others are slowly coming to the conclusion that the new space strategy is neither a panacea nor a "whole of government" document.

As outlined in the March 25th, 2019 SpaceQ post, "Opinion: Finally, a New Canadian Space Strategy – But Wait, What do we do With This?," a few are beginning to ask about the absence of a Canadian government commitment to regulatory reform in the document.

As outlined in the April 1st, 2019 Ottawa Citizen post, "Steer: Space needs more Canada – but Canada needs a better approach to space," at least one person, Dr. Cassandra Steer, an independent space security consultant contracted to Kanata ON based Space Strategies Consulting Ltd., has also questioned the absence of commitment to international space security initiatives in the new space policy.

These concerns are just the beginning. Expect more to surface over the next few months as the full extent of the Liberals failure in the area begins to sink in.

Chuck Black.

___________________________________________________________

Chuck Black is the editor of the Commercial Space blog. 

The Next Three Important Dates For the Canadian Space Industry

          By Chuck Black

The 2019 Canadian Federal Budget (expected to be tabled in the Canadian House of Commons on March 19th, 2019), along with the fourth quarter 2018 report (expected on February 28th, 2019) and the year-end stockholder meeting (currently scheduled for May 8th, 2019) of Westminster CO based Maxar Technologies, are currently the hottest topics of gossip among those who focus on the Canadian space industry.

How did that happen?

It's because Brampton ON based MDA is both the maker of Canada's iconic Canadarm and a Maxar subsidiary. Since the formation of the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) in 1989, the space industry in Canada has been wrapped around Federal government funding for its favorite contractor.

This state of affairs is in the midst of changing. But change comes slowly to the industry and many are hoping that change will be delayed or superseded by announcements deriving from one or more of those events.

As outlined in the February 20th, 2019 CTV News post, "2019 federal budget to be tabled March 19: Morneau," Finance Minister Bill Morneau "will introduce the Liberal government's pre-election budget on March 19 in a document expected to touch the issues of prescription drug costs, skills training for workers and helping more millennials get into the housing market."

As part of the budget, the government may or may not announce a commitment to the Lunar Orbital Platform Gateway (LOP-G),  a US based initiative with a Canadian component manufactured by Maxar Technologies and covered previously in this blog, most recently in the the January 10th, 2019 post, "That Canadian Space Plan Where We Give Most of the Funding to a Failing, Foreign Owned Maxar is Dumb."

An announcement in favour of the LOP-G would be a boon to Maxar/MDA since the company would then be almost guaranteed to receive a multi-billion dollar contract to build a new "next-generation" Canadarm for the LOP-G.

But that might also not happen because, as noted most recently in the January 30th, 2019 post, "Why did Maxar Subsidiary SSL "Terminate" its Participation in the DARPA GEOsynchronous Satellite Servicing Program?," Maxar has been having a bad year and governments don't want to be perceived to be supporting failing, foreign owned companies.

As for the other two dates, they will likely be the two last chances for a failing Maxar to put its fiscal house in order.

According to the February 7th, 2019 Maxar press release, "Maxar Technologies Fourth Quarter 2018 Investor Call Scheduled for Thursday, February 28 2019," new Maxar President and CEO Daniel Jablonsky and recently appointed Executive VP and CFO Biggs Porter will host an earnings conference call to review Maxar's fourth quarter results, on February 28th, 2019.

Jablonsky and Porter (or their replacements, if nothing improves after after the fourth quarter results are announced) will also likely be around for the year-end stock holder meeting which, according to the January 29th, 2019 Maxar press release, "Maxar Technologies Announces Date of Annual Meeting of Stockholders," will be held on May 8th, 2019.

According to the February 13th, 2019 Seeking Alpha post, "Maxar Technologies: Betting On Space," Maxar needs to announce a cut of the quarterly stock dividend plus the successful sale of Palo Alto CA based Maxar subsidiary SSL for a reasonable amount of money, perhaps around $500Mln US ($660Mln CDN), in order to turn around the company.

Of course, even a big Maxar turnaround might not shake any LOP-G commitments from an embattled Federal government gearing up for a fall Federal election.

The Justin Trudeau Liberals might simply have too much on their plate to worry about any large but failing multi-national corporation other than the Montreal PQ based SNC Lavalin.

But that would be another story entirely.

Chuck Black.

___________________________________________________________

Chuck Black is the editor of the Commercial Space blog. 

When it Comes to the LOP-G, NASA Should Summon ESPRIT and/or Call for a Falcon

          By Brian Orlotti

European engineers have designed a new robotic logistical spacecraft for NASA's proposed Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway (LOP-G).

Initial concept of the ESPRIT module, as of September 2017. Graphic c/o RussianSpaceWeb.

As outlined in the September 9th, 2018 Russia Space Web post, "ESA develops logistics vehicle for cis-lunar outpost," the new module, dubbed the European system providing refueling infrastructure and telecommunications (ESPRIT) is intended to supply fuel, power and communications for the LOP-G.

Its design is a compromise intended to compensate for changes made in early 2017 to the LOP-G's assembly schedule which imposed severe mass restrictions and, therefore, fuel restrictions on its first component.

The LOP-G’s planned first component, the power and propulsion bus (PPB) was to have been launched in 2023. In May of 2017, to deal with the imposed mass restrictions, engineers at the European Space Agency (ESA) proposed to split the PPB into two separately launched modules.

The second module, dubbed the logistics communication and utilization bay (LCUB), would offload certain tasks previously assigned to the PPB. It could take on a Canadarm, a small airlock for scientific experiments and communications gear. The LCUB would also feature an observation window in its airlock.

In mid-2017, the LCUB was renamed to ESPRIT. As its name implies, the spacecraft would carry xenon and hydrazine fuel and directly plug into the propulsion system of the PPB. ESPRIT’s onboard communications system would enable it to serve as a comms relay between assets on the lunar surface, other spacecraft and Earth.

The Japanese space agency, JAXA, is considering installing an experimental optical communications system on ESPRIT.

In order to maneuver the module to the cis-lunar station, ESPRIT would be launched along with a space tug based on the Japanese HTV or a private vehicle.

In April 2018, the new Falcon Heavy rocket became another potential carrier for ESPRIT. Launching ESPRIT on a Falcon Heavy rocket would enable it carry more fuel. However neither NASA nor the ESA have confirmed whether they would actually make use of a Falcon Heavy.

After its initial internal studies, the ESA decided that further development of ESPRIT would be conducted under contracts awarded to industry on a competitive basis.

One such contract was given to a group comprised of Toulouse France based Airbus, Cannes France based Thales Alenia Space and Bremen Germany based OHB.

The next phases of ESPRIT’s development, known as Phase B2/C and D, are scheduled to begin in early 2020 with a flightworthy module delivered to its launch site in Florida by mid-2023 and launched on an NASA's costly Space Launch System (SLS) rocket in late 2023 or 2024.

An NASA powerpoint slide from an August 27th, 2018 NASA Advisory Council meeting released by NASAWatch via twitter. As outlined in the August 27th, 2018 NASAWatch post, "NASA Wants the Lunar Gateway To Do Everything for Everyone," the final design of the LOP-G has not been finalized and NASA may be overpromising features and functionality in order to secure funding and molify potential partners. It's also worth noting that the ESPRIT module doesn't seem to be included in this slide. Graphic c/o NASA.

With NASA and the ESA’s bureaucratic miasma causing delays, redesigns and compromises, one is temped to ask why the two space agencies have stuck with the SLS launcher for ESPRIT.

Favouring a scarce, prohibitively expensive launcher versus Falcon Heavy, a cheaper system now actually being produced, does little for efficiency.

‘Not Invented Here’ syndrome, perhaps?

Brian Orlotti.

  ______________________________________________________________

Brian Orlotti is a network operator at the Ontario Research and Innovation Optical Network (ORION), a not-for-profit network service provider to the education and research sectors.