A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions

Part 4: Funding an Appropriate Force

          By Chuck Black

This series of posts is attempting to answer some of the questions surrounding the appropriate Canadian response to the recently announced US plan to create an expanded United States Space Force. 

Part one ("The Axworthy Doctrine") focused on how the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's led to a new Canadian focus on aggressive, international peacekeeping missions requiring space focused communication and surveillance capabilities of a type which Canada did not then possess and had to borrow from the Americans.

The Northwest Passage and its challenges. Graphic c/o World Cultural Pictorial.

Part two ("The Changing Political Landscape") discussed why Canada never had a military space policy prior to 1998 by going back to the 1960's and the federal liberal party under Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau who refused to differentiate between space based military assets for communication/ surveillance and space ‘weaponization’ in order to come across as supporters of the United Nations Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the UN Outer Space Treaty (1967).

Part three ("Towards Northern Sovereignty") dealt with the changing focus of Canadian foreign policy from international peacekeeping towards northern sovereignty, a policy developed in the 1990's under Jean Chrétien. It's a policy which often places us at odds with traditional allies, such as the US.

Here is part four of this series.

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So what tools does the Canadian military need to acquire in order to reliably perform its missions? To answer that question, we need to know the missions.

In 2008 incoming Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper defined those missions in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) which mandated the capability to undertake them, either separately or together. 

They included:

• Conducting daily domestic and continental operations, including the Arctic and with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

• Supporting a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Winter Olympics. 
• Responding to a major terrorist attack. 

• Supporting civilian authorities during a domestic crisis or natural disaster. 

• Leading and/or conducting a major international operation for an extended period. 

• Deploying forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods. 

Of course, the Harper government intended to make a series of equipment purchases in order to bolster the DND ability to undertake the above missions.

PM Harper in 2008. Photo c/o Britannica.

The purchases included:

• New military trucks, land combat vehicles and support systems.

• C-17 Globemaster and C-130J Hercules aircraft plus CH-47F Chinook helicopters for troop transport and additional fixed wing aircraft for maritime patrol, and search and rescue. 

• New naval vessels including at least one icebreaker (the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker), three joint support vessels (to replace the aging HMCS Protecteur and HMCS Preserver), between six to eight arctic offshore patrol ships and the Canadian single class surface combatant (which will replace the aging Iroquois class destroyers starting in 2016-2017 and the Halifax-class frigates at a later date). 

• 65 new Lockheed Martin F-35 Lighting II fighter jets to replace 1980s era CF-18 Hornets. 

Naturally, when purchases are contemplated a budget is needed and the budget for this program was a big one. It called for an annual increase in DND funding from $18Bln CDN in 2007-2008 to over $30Bln CDN by 2027-2028 and totaled out at around $490Bln CDN over the 20 year period covered by the strategy.

That's a lot of money.

The space component of the package was designed primarily to tie together all the big ticket ships, planes and other equipment to insure that they can communicate with each other and sense what's going on around them.

As the eyes and ears of the future Canadian Forces, the space component might also be the most important part of the program. It was certainly the least expensive.

It was wrapped around a variety of space based systems including RADARSAT, RADARSAT 2 and the follow-on RADARSAT Constellation project, which used synthetic aperture radars (SAR) designed to obtain a finer spatial resolution than is possible with conventional photography or radar scans, and their associated ground stations.

Also of note was the ship tracking capabilities of Cambridge ON based exactEarth LLP (then a subsidiary of Cambridge ON based ComDev International) and several smaller satellites such as the Sapphire Canadian space surveillance satellite (launched in 2013 and built by MDA) and the Near Earth Object Surveillance Satellite (NEOSSat) launched in 2013 ostensibly to track small asteroids near Earth asteroids but partially funded by the Canadian military for its ability to also track orbiting satellites.

These smaller systems allowed Canada to continue doing pretty much what it had been doing since the 1990's, which was to build smaller components which could be plugged into larger systems developed by others to gain access to those systems and help to offset some of the costs of national defence.

Of course, the key to the implementation of the complete plan was consistent policy and long term funding guarantees, a situation that wasn't entirely possible given the lack of consensus over defence spending within the various Canadian political players over the last few decades.

According to the Air Force Association of Canada 2008 position paper titled "Implementing the Canada First Defence Strategy," while it's easy enough to support the CFDS, the 'devil' was always in the details:

Indeed, the Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Security has been openly critical of the need for the Government to redress the level of the Defence budget to ensure that the CFDS is affordable. 

Concern has also been expressed regarding the ability of DND, working with Public Works and Government Works Canada, to implement the scope of projects identified for prosecution. The involved procurement process for defence projects, coupled with the demands placed on a limited number of program staff, mitigate against timely acquisitions.

Moreover, the political imperative for attractive industrial and regional benefits to offset large offshore purchases further compounds the process and length of time to get to contract. A federal election will also present delays in government approvals or potentially a change in direction if the party in power changes.

Perhaps that's why no one held their breath waiting for the implementation of the CFDP and why no one suffocated when the Harper government failed to allocate sufficient funding to move the program forward.

By 2015, it was time for the Federal Justin Trudeau Liberal government to have a kick at the can. Their plan will be the subject our the next post 

Chuck Black.

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Chuck Black is the editor of the Commercial Space blog. 

Portions of  this multi-part overview were originally published in the January 16th, 2011 post, "Canada's Military Space Policy: Part 4, Funding an Appropriate Force."





Last episode: "Towards Northern Sovereignty," as part three of "A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions," continues.

Next episode: "The Current Liberal Government," as part five of "A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions," continues.

UTIAS-SFL and Raytheon Canada Building Military Funded Spy Sats

          By Brian Orlotti

The University of Toronto’s Institute for Aerospace Studies (UTIAS) Space Flight Laboratory (SFL) has announced that it will develop three microsatellites to demonstrate ‘new’ air and maritime surveillance technology for Canada’s North.

As outlined in the February 1st, 2019 University of Toronto Engineering News post, "U of T Engineering researchers to design microsatellites for Arctic monitoring," the project, dubbed Gray Jay Pathfinder (GJP), is a partnership between UTIAS SFL, Woodbridge ON based Raytheon Canada and the Department of National Defence (DND).

Under the partnership, UTIAS SFL will build the GJP microsats while Raytheon Canada develops the onboard electronics.

The program is being funded as part of the DND’s All Domain Situational Awareness Science & Technology (ADSA S&T) program at a total of $46.2Mln CDN, with UTIAS SFL receiving $15Mln and Raytheon Canada getting $31.2Mln. The funding was allocated as part of 2018 Canadian Defence Budget, which provided a 70% increase in funding for Canada's military.

Raytheon Canada’s electronics will demonstrate a distinctly Canadian version of what most modern military knows as over-the-horizon radar (OTH). The Raytheon name for it is "Skywave radar technology" and many of the concepts surrounding it were discussed in the October 2006 Defence R&D Canada Technical Memorandum (TM 2006-285) titled, "A Canadian Perspective on High-Frequency Over-the-Horizon Radar," although the program was active in the 1980's.

Traditional radar systems are line-of-sight, meaning that they cannot detect objects beyond their horizon (typically a few hundred kilometres). Skywave radar overcomes this limitation by bouncing its signals off the ionosphere, increasing range to thousthe ands of kilometres.

OTH radar, first developed in the 1960’s, has been in use for decades by the major powers as well as smaller nations, including the US, Russia, France, China, Australia and Iran.

As outlined in the February 2nd, 2019 Canadian Defence Review post, "Canada Awards Contracts In Support of Arctic Surveillance," the Skywave/OTH radar technology will enable rapid detection and identification of surface and airborne targets, greatly enhancing the Canadian Forces’ situational awareness in the North.

In addition and as outlined in the post, "solutions achieved under the ADSA program will contribute to joint efforts between Canada and the United States to modernize elements of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)."

The need to beef up Canada’s surveillance capabilities has been made more urgent in recent years by several factors;

• Severe gaps in Canada’s surveillance capabilities due to the failure of the Canadian military’s Northern Watch program, the recent outages of the RADARSAT-2 satellite (most recently as noted in the December 21st, 2018 post, "BREAKING NEWS: RADARSAT-2 Offline for Most of the Week. RADARSAT Constellation February 2019 Launch Date in Doubt") and delays to the RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM).

• Increased challenges to Canadian sovereignty as Arctic sea lanes see greater international traffic due to climate change-induced melting of polar ice.

• The increasingly hostile geopolitical environment, including renewed Cold War tensions following the US’ withdrawal from a key nuclear weapons treaty, the US/China trade war, and US belligerence towards Canada during the recent NAFTA renegotiation

Canada must overcome its peaceful complacency if it is to survive in an increasingly unstable world.

Brian Orlotti.

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Brian Orlotti is a network operator at the Ontario Research and Innovation Optical Network (ORION), a not-for-profit network service provider to the education and research sectors.

A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions

Part 3: Towards Northern Sovereignty

          By Chuck Black

This series of posts is attempting to answer some of the questions surrounding the appropriate Canadian response to the recently announced US plan to create an expanded United States Space Force.

Past, present and future Liberal Prime Ministers in 1968. Pierre Trudeau, John Turner, Lester Pearson and Jean Chretian overlooked by the press and the image of Sir Wilfred Laurier. Photo c/o Wikipedia.

In part one, titled "The Axworthy Doctrine," we attempted to answer some of those questions by showing how the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's led to a Canadian reassessment of the four traditional pillars of our national defense strategy and a new focus on international peacekeeping. This new policy required space focused communication and surveillance capabilities and led directly to our first military space policy in 1998. 

Part two, titled "The Changing Political Landscape" discussed why Canada never had a military space policy prior to 1998 by going back to the 1960's and the federal liberal party under Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau. 

Here is part three of this series.

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Canadian Prime Ministers Pearson and Trudeau essentially refused to differentiate between space based military assets for communication/ surveillance and space "weaponization" (placing weapons in space) in order to be perceived of as strong, international supporters of the United Nations Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the UN Outer Space Treaty (1967).

This led to the shutting down of most Canadian military space programs and a focus on space science, exploration and technologies with civilian applications that could be spun off into profitable companies.

Beginning in 1993, under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, the government moved to slowly address this situation by putting into place a series of military restructurings which culminated in the creation of the Directorate of Space Development (DSpaceD) in 1997.

Over the next two decades and much like any aggressive and growing bureaucracy, the Canadian government slowly acquired a series of assets to enable DSpaceD to perform a useful function.

The various RADARSAT programs, with their dual military/civilian use (culminating in RADARSAT Constellation, expected to be launched sometime in the spring of 2019) and the DND Sapphire space surveillance satellite, launched in 2013 to provide data to the United States Space Surveillance Network (SSN) are current examples of useful Canadian space policy tools.

But those contributions were essentially used as keys to access larger US space surveillance and Earth imaging technology such as the SSN. Canada had no real intention of building a stand alone system mostly because it didn't have the money.

The Chrétien government spent its time in office focused on gaining control of a Federal deficit which had ballooned under both Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. As part of his program, Chrétietn tended to want to contribute to this program and not spend enough extra government money to develop an independent Canadian military space capacity.

Overall, the stuff the Canadians needed to borrow from the Americans in order to maintain their operational military capacity, simply ended up reminding the Americans that Canada was no longer capable of contributing it's "fair share" to defense without substantial assistance.

It's a state of affairs which has lasted ever since.

By 2008, James Fergusson, the Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba and Stephen James, the Director of the Executive MBA Asper School of Business at the University of Manitoba could legitimately claim in their "Report on Canada, National Security and Outer Space" that:

Canada has no overarching national space policy, and space is not addressed in either of the latest national security and defence policies. 

Space is so structurally buried and fragmented within government that voices advocating for more appropriate treatment of space security issues are marginalized, even within such departments as Industry Canada (now Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, the Canadian Space Agency's parent department) and the Department of National Defence (DND).

The Canadian Space Agency’s (CSA) budget, and accordingly, its interests and activities have been diminishing and narrowing around space science and exploration for the last decade (dominated by human space flight and international space station programs), leaving little investment opportunity for other space pursuits (i.e., space-based services and access to space). 

The DND, while pursuing the development of a small space-surveillance satellite (Project Sapphire), has progressively scaled back its space interests and pursuits since its mid-1990s peak. Even then, those interests and pursuits were modest, end-user focused, and highly reliant on American leadership and resources.

Fortunately for the military space advocates, by 2008 the liberals were no longer in power and the newly elected Conservative Stephen Harper government was busy developing what they called the Canada First - Defense Strategy.

Officially focused around increased funding (from $18Bln CDN in 2007-2008 to over $30Bln CDN in 2027-2028) and new equipment purchases for what is supposed to be variety of domestic and international missions, the new policy had a practical focus on protecting Canadian claims of arctic sovereignty.

Why would Canada be doing this?

According to the July 7th, 2007 New Scientist TV post, "Canada boosts military presence in the Arctic," the country:

... is in dispute with its neighbour, the US, over the ownership of the northwest passage. If sea-ice continues to shrink, this passage could knock a third off the trip from Europe to Asia. Currently, the shortest route involves crossing through the Panama Canal.

Harper's determination to show that Canada will not be booted out of the Arctic is such that he has decided to put $2.9Bln US ($3.8Bln CDN) towards building up his nation's military presence in the area. This will help buy eight new ice-breaker military patrol ships and build a new port in the north of Canada.

According to the article, our long-term allies had suddenly become our major competitors, at least in the high arctic.

If the Federal government really wanted new military purchases, expanded operations and increased infrastructure they would also require expanded communications and area surveillance capabilities of the type most effectively provided by space based assets.

Only this time, the Canadian government was supposed to have actually purchased those assets and not just borrowed them from patient allies. 

We didn't and the consequences of that decision will be discussed in our next post.

Chuck Black.

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Chuck Black is the editor of the Commercial Space blog. 

Portions of  this  multipart overview were originally published in the January 03, 2011 post, "Canada's Military Space Policy: Part 3, The Changing Political Landscape." Towards Northern Sovereignty."






Last episode: "The Changing Political Landscape," as part two of "A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions," begins.

Next episode: "Funding an Appropriate Force," as part four of "A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions," continues.

Why did Maxar Subsidiary SSL "Terminate" its Participation in the DARPA GEOsynchronous Satellite Servicing Program?

          By Chuck Black

It's hard be believe that Palo Alto CA based SSL, a subsidiary of Westminster CO based Maxar Technologies, would drop any of its US government contracts, even a public/private partnership requiring private sector funding in order to proceed.

After all, acquiring US government and military contracts was the core reason why Richmond BC based MacDonald Dettwiler (MDA) began the process of reincorporation, or "US domestication," which turned the company into US based Maxar, a firm able to bid on American government and military contracts.

But, in the latest of a series of odd twists in the ongoing Maxar meltdown, the firm announced earlier today that it has:

...exercised its right to terminate participation in the Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites (RSGS) program, a public-private partnership with the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), citing a need to focus its resources on ensuring optimal returns when weighed against other capital priorities, such as WorldView Legion. SSL remains unwavering in its commitment to its customers on all existing contracts...

As outlined in the January 30th, 2019 Maxar press release, "Maxar Technologies' SSL Terminates its Participation in DARPA's Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites Program," the decision:

...is consistent with Maxar's commitment to disciplined prioritization of capital. Maxar remains confident in the potential of the on-orbit servicing market and the value of public private partnerships. 

According to the press release, SSL will also be terminating its associated contract with Menlo Park CA based Space Infrastructure Services LLC (SIS), a company SSL created in 2017 to commercialized the RSGS technologies developed from the DARPA program. SSL is currently controlled by Menlo Park CA based Finance Technology Leverage LLC, a venture capital firm focused around  biotechnology, energy and space technology.

As of press time, SSL retains its role as prime contractor for the NASA RESTORE-L robotic satellite servicing mission, a fixed price NASA contract worth between $600 - $700Mln US ($800 - $925Mln CDN) designed around a SSL 1300 satellite bus equipped to service orbiting satellites. The first RESOLVE-L is currently scheduled for launch sometime in 2020.

But while the official reason for the contract cancellation is the need to conserve funds in order to help pay down the high debt load, that decision could be problematic over the long-term given the increasing popularity and use of public/private partnerships for NASA and US military procurement contracts.

The decision doesn't do anything to dispel the growing perception that Maxar is attempting to sell SSL, but has so far been unable to find a buyer.

For all it's worth, the RESTORE-L program isn't moving forward very fast either. As outlined in the March 19th, 2017 post, "American MDA Subsidiary Promotes "DEXTRE" for US as NASA RESTORE-L Satellite Servicing Budget Slashed," RESTORE-L funding was cut from $133Mln USD ($178Mln CDN) to $45Mln US ($60Mln CDN) for fiscal year 2018.

FY 2019 funding for RESTORE-L is caught up in the fight between the US president and congress over funding the proposed US/Mexico border "wall" and hasn't yet been formally approved.

As outlined in the June 12th, 2018 Space News post, "Senate bill restores funding for NASA science and technology demonstration missions," the original FY 2019 Senate budget bill approved by the US Senate appropriations subcommittee in June 2018 included $180Mln US ($237Mln CDN) for RESTORE-L.

However, the article noted that "NASA had proposed turning Restore-L into a more general technology development program rather than a full-fledged mission to demonstrate satellite servicing technologies."

Part of the reason for that could potentially be related to Maxar's insistence, as outlined originally in the December 16th, 2016 post, "MDA says No Sale of Canadarm Technology to the US Government in NASA RESTORE-L, DARPA RSGS or "Any Other" Project," that no Canadian based Canadarm technology is being used by Maxar in any of its US projects.

If NASA feels the need to first "develop" the necessary technology before moving ahead with a full fledged mission, there must certainly be questions about Maxar's ability to fulfill the RESTORE-L mission within the scheduled time frame.

Of course, there could be another reason. If the market for geosynchronous satellites has crashed, there would certainly be less need for satellites to repair the big geosynchronous satellites, which are in the midst of being replaced by larger constellations of smaller, easily replaceable low and medium Earth orbiting satellites.

Now that's an interesting thought.

Expect more bad news about Maxar and its subsidiaries to surface reasonably soon.

Chuck Black.

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Chuck Black is the editor of the Commercial Space blog. 

The Growing Military Challenges From Foreign Space Assets

          By Henry Stewart

The US Air Force has released an unclassified report on the growing military challenges posed by foreign controlled space assets.

No sharks, but "frickin" laser beams are included. An interesting overview of potential space based weapons from the NASIC "Competing in Space" report. Graphic c/o NASIC.

The fifteen page report, titled "Competing in Space," contains sections on space trends, assets, applications, satellites, launch capabilities, warfare, situational awareness, cyber and electronic threats, anti-satellite missiles, energy directed weapons in space and an overall outlook for the future.

As outlined in the January 16th, 2019 National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) post, "USAF, NASIC releases unclassified ‘Competing in Space’ assessment," the report was created at the request of Air Force senior leaders by the NASIC public affairs office at Wright PAtterson Air Force Base OH to serve as a discussion awareness tool for the public.

It's essential reading to provide context for American plans to create an independent US Space Force co-equal with other branches of the military.

NASIC is the US Air Force unit tasked with analyzing military intelligence on foreign air and space forces, their weapons and systems.

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Henry Stewart is the pseudonym of a Toronto based aerospace writer.

Maxar's Theme Music for its Newly Scheduled AGM on May 8th, 2019 Should be the Theme to the Benny Hill Show

          By Chuck Black

Stand by for thrills, chills, spills and comedy! Westminster CO based Maxar Technologies has announced the date, time and location for its 2019 annual general meeting (AGM).

The theme for the meeting, although officially unstated, might logically be "Yakety Sax," an instrumental jointly composed by James Q. "Spider" Rich and Boots Randolph in the 1960's, which later gained fame as the theme song for the Benny Hill Show.

The program, a skit based British based comedy program which ran from 1969 - 1989, often used the tune for background during scenes where people ran around confused and at high speeds.

The confusing component of the Maxar AGM is the part where 90% of Maxar stock value essentially disappeared over the last year. Shareholders are expected to run around at high speeds during the AGM in an attempt to either regenerate the missing stock value or find someone else to blame for the loss.

Just like the Benny Hill show.

As outlined in the January 28th, 2019 Maxar press release, "Maxar Technologies Announces Date of Annual Meeting of Stockholders," the AGM will be held on Wednesday, May 8th, 2019, at 2:00 pm local time, at Maxar headquarters in Westminster, Colorado. 

According to the press release:

Stockholders as of the record date, close of business on March 20, 2019, will be entitled to vote at the meeting. This will be Maxar's first annual meeting of shareholders as a Delaware corporation following its US domestication (or reincorporation as a US based company) on January 1, 2019...

Of course, the May 2019 meeting date is also a substantial delay after Maxar's last earnings report which, as outlined in the October 31st, 2018 Maxar press release, "Maxar Technologies Reports Third Quarter 2018 Results, Declares Quarterly Dividend," occurred back in October 2018.

Despite the title of the press release, the third quarter 2018 was essentially a fiscal disaster which, as outlined in the November 1st, 2018 post, "Maxar Technologies Share Price Collapses After Q3 Earnings Report Released," noted revenue shortfalls and a high debt load, which both contributed to Maxars stock collapse.

As noted in the January 23rd, 2019 Globe and Mail post, "Why Maxar shareholders found it hard to sell during the stock’s big plunge," Canadian holders of Maxar stock have their own, unique and special reason to be confused and run around at high speeds during the AGM.

According to the post, Maxar’s Canadian stockholders were essentially unable to unload their shares during a two day period in January 2019, when Maxar shares traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) lost almost 50% of their share value.

Of course, if one wanted a more serious take on the proceedings, it could be noted that one of the big problems is the worldwide slowdown in new geostationary (GEO) and medium Earth orbit (MEO) comsat contracts since 2000. The slowdown has hit Maxar subsidiary, the Palo Alto CA SSL especially hard since SSL traditionally  focused on the high profit GEO and MEO manufacturing market. In 2000, forty preliminary orders were placed for GEO and MEO satellites (five through SSL) and twenty-seven of those orders were eventually fulfilled (four through SSL). In 2018, only thirteen orders were placed for GEO and MEO comsats (two through SSL) and ten are still on track for completion (one through SSL). Graphic c/o Gunters Space Page.

Maxar executives will also need to worry about an increasing number of lawsuits from disgruntled investors.

As outlined in the January 17th, 2019 post, "Maxar Technologies Hit With Class Action Lawsuit Over "False and Misleading Statements." More Lawsuits On the Way," the various suits will likely claim "materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business, operational and compliance policies (during the period from March 29th, 2018 through January 7th, 2019)" and will seek damages as a result of those statements. It's quite likely that some of those items will also be discussed during the AGM.

As well, the question of whatever happened to an existing proposal from Maxar executives to sell portions or all of Palo Alto CA based SSL (a Maxar subsidiary) in order to raise funding to pay down the Maxar debt load could also be addressed.

Originally, an announcement on that matter was supposed to be made before the end of 2018. Since nothing has been announced, except for the sale of property owned in Palo Alto by SSL (as outlined in the December 6th, 2018 Space News post, "Maxar sells portion of SSL real estate"). It's a fair bet that Maxar executives weren't able to sell much more than the real estate, which is why they never brought up the idea again,

Perhaps the next quarterly report, which Maxar originally promised sometime in February 2019. will be better and shed some light on the above listed issues. Or maybe not.

Either way, the result will likely encourage more confused running around at high speed by Maxar executives over the next few months.

As Benny Hill used to say, "Do unto others, then run."

Chuck Black.

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Chuck Black is the editor of the Commercial Space blog. 

Airbus and Thales Athena Maxar Teams Complete System Requirements Reviews for Telesat LEO Constellation

          By Henry Stewart

Ottawa ON based Telsat has announced that the two teams developing competing designs for Telesat’s global low earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellation have successfully completed their system requirements reviews.

As outlined in the January 24th, 2019 Telesat press release, "System Requirements Review Completed for Telesat’s LEO Constellation" both teams, the first led by Leiden Netherlands based Airbus Defence and Space (Airbus) with a second composed of Cannes France based Thales Alenia Space and Westminster CO based Maxar Technologies, are "continuing to advance their detailed designs for the complete LEO system, both space and ground segments."

Systems requirement reviews typically examine functional and performance requirements to insure that the concept proposal will satisfy the mission. They are a critical component in the design review.

As outlined on its website, the Telesat global LEO constellation is a proposed:

... state-of-the-art satellite constellation of highly advanced satellites in low-earth-orbit (~1,000 km from earth; ~35 times closer than traditional satellites) that will seamlessly integrate with terrestrial networks. 

The global network will deliver fiber quality throughput (Gbps links; low latency) anywhere on earth. This is a highly flexible system that dynamically allocates capacity where there’s demand, thus maximizing system efficiency.

Telesat has worldwide rights to the ≈4 GHz of Ka-band spectrum the constellation will use. Initial funding for the LEO constellation was provided by the Canadian and Ontario governments.

As outlined in the August 2nd, 2018 post, "Airbus Competing Against Thales/ Maxar to Design and Build the 117 Satellite Telesat Constellation," two Telesat development satellites using slightly different design philosophies were initially contracted for testing. However:

... the low Earth orbit prototype 2 (LEO-2) built by Palo Alto, CA based SSL (a Maxar subsidiary) with Toronto ON based University of Toronto Institute of Aerospace Studies (UTIAS) Spaceflight Laboratories (SFL) acting as prime contractor, was lost when the Soyuz-2.1b rocket carrying the satellite failed to reach orbit in November 2017.  

LEO Vantage-1, built by Guildford UK based Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL), a world leader in small satellites and part of Airbus Defence and Space, launched successfully in January 2018.

While it's not clear how the LEO-2 team completed their reviews without a satellite to test, it seems that both teams are still in the running.

Telsat has promised that a final decision on which team will build the Telesat LEO constellation will be made later this year.

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Henry Stewart is the pseudonym of a Toronto based aerospace writer.

A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions

Part 2: The Changing Political Landscape

          By Chuck Black

The US plan to create an expanded United States Space Force independent of the other five branches of the US military is slowly taking form in the current Donald Trump administration, but the genesis of the concept goes back to the 1980's and Ronald Reagan's Star Wars Strategic Defence Initiative. 

Since the new plan will essentially absorb major components of existing North American defence, including the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), there is no question that Canada's current defence policy, as outlined in the January 17th, 2019 Federal government overview, "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy," will need to be revised to reconcile existing policies and partnerships with future US actions and intentions.

Below is the second part of a short history of Canadian space defence planning which would suggest that there are certain defence components which Canada might want to carry out independently of the US. 

_________________________________________________________________________________

This series of posts is attempting to answer some of the questions surrounding the appropriate Canadian response to the recently announced US plan to create an expanded United States Space Force. 

Jean Chrétien in 2008. Photo c/o Wikipedia.

Part one, titled "The Axworthy Doctrine," highlighted how the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's led Canada to re-orient defense spending away from traditional Canadian priorities and towards international peacekeeping missions as defined by the concept of "human security."

This doctrine was initially viewed by the governing Liberal party under then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien as a great way to save money, but also created a requirement to support a far more combat capable force on lengthy international missions.

The easiest way to do that, at least according to the Summer 2000 Canadian Military Journal article "Is the Sky Falling? Canada's Defence Space Program at the Crossroads," was to develop an indigenous military space communications and surveillance capability.

Curiously enough, that capability was surprisingly similar to some of the concepts included within Ronald Reagan's 1980's era Star Wars Strategic Defence Initiative and carried over into the current Trump Space Force proposal.

According to the article:

The massive troop deployments of the 1990s highlighted the immediate requirement for adequate indigenous Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM). The increased employment of precision guided munitions demonstrated a growing dependence on accurate strategic intelligence, satellite imagery, and satellite navigation and positioning. Also, the general increase in littoral operations by naval forces placed a greater dependence on accurate meteorological and geodetic capabilities.

As the (Canadian) government continued to commit Canadian Forces across the world, more and more space support was necessary. 

Reluctantly perhaps, the Liberal government accepted that the militarization of space was a long-existing fact that had to be publicly supported if it was to meet other foreign policy goals.

Why was the Liberal government so very reluctant to accept the "militarization of space?" According to the article there was ample precedent for this reluctance:

Canada’s endorsement of the United Nation’s treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in 1963 (the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) and the United Nation’s Outer Space Treaty (UNOST) in 1967 were interpreted almost verbatim by Ottawa, and led to the removal of DRB (the Defence Research Board) control from most of Canada’s space projects.

The first Trudeau government saw no distinction between the militarization of space (placing military space assets in orbit) and the ‘weaponization’ of space (placing weapons in orbit), and moved quickly to deprive Canada’s military of any space assets or capability. 

Pierre Trudeau in 1971. Photo c/o Life Site.

In 1968, the government withdrew financial support from most defence space projects, preferring instead to concentrate its resources on the development of a domestic satellite communications system (through Ottawa ON based Telesat, which was then a newly minted government crown corporation).

In essence, the long-term Canadian government policy, starting from the 1960's and continuing at least until the middle 1990's, was to simply "withdraw financial support" from the military in favor of civilian programs wrapped around commercial concerns.

By 1994, this historic neglect of the Canadian military was no longer a reasonable option. According to the article:

As future space technologies all but eliminate Canada’s traditional geographic situational importance, Ottawa will have to rely on providing a share of the security burden rather than relying on the outdated American involuntary guarantee of protection.

These new technologies, and the potential for even more radical improvements on the horizon helped the Canadian military to push forward a plan to insure that a requirement for a Canadian communications and surveillance capability would be at least be addressed:

Despite the rapid alteration of the global strategic environment in the late 1980s, and a succession of external conflicts and internal DND strife in the early 1990s, Canada successfully formulated both a DND space policy and an organization with which to implement it. 

In July 1989, the Chief of Review Services (CRS) tabled a comprehensive report on Canada’s defence space programme that initiated a series of policy recommendations over the next several years.

A Space Defence Working Group (SDWG) was formed, and in 1992 it tabled its first comprehensive space policy. During the next four years, the SDWG developed plans and planning guidance documents, which among other items highlighted the requirement for an indigenous military space-based capability. 

In 1996, the management structure was then reviewed which resulted in the creation of the Directorate of Space Development (D Space D) in 1997 under the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS). 

But while the military had at least put in place a command structure, there were no real resources for the "indigenous military space-based capability" to command.

The Canadian military's financial position remained precarious and the situation virtually guaranteed the continued, heavy reliance on foreign, mostly US based space assistance to fulfill defense needs.

This put a considerable strain the Canada/US relationship.

As well, an evolving US strategy (ironically enough, based on core concepts quite similar to those found in the Canadian advocated Axworthy Doctrine) slowly caused the Chrétien government to back away from some of the more critical practices associated with the US "global war on terror."

This added a little extra strain to the relationship.

Of course, there has been exceptions to this continued, heavy reliance on US assets for Canadian defence.

The various RADARSAT programs, with their dual military/civilian use (culminating in RADARSAT Constellation, expected to be launched sometime this spring) and the DND Sapphire space surveillance satellite, launched in 2013 to provide data to the United States Space Surveillance Network (SSN) are current examples of useful Canadian contributions.

But the long-term US conception of Canadian military capabilities remains trapped in the perception that Canada should pay more for its own defence. Besides, the Trump administration seems to have no problem with renegotiating agreements it believes are "unfair."

So we've moved away from the situation existing throughout the 1960's to the 1990's when Canadian space policy provided no support whatsoever for military activities to the point where where the federal government created the beginnings of an indigenous military space communications and surveillance capability to support Canadian troops on international missions.

This brings us to 2008 and the Harper Government's Canada First - Defense Strategy. How does the issuance of that government policy paper influence and effect the current Canadian military space policy and how does the 2008 policy fit into US space force discussions?

That will be the subject of our next post on this topic.

Chuck Black.

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Chuck Black is the editor of the Commercial Space blog. 

Portions of  this  multipart overview were originally published in the December 27th, 2010 post, "Canada's Military Space Policy: Part 2, The Changing Political Landscape."






Last episode: "The Axworthy Doctrine," as part one of "A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions," begins.

Next episode: "Towards Northern Sovereignty," as part three of "A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions," continues.

Chinese and US Space Rapprochement

          By Brian Orlotti

The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has announced that it is collaborating with China’s national space agency on lunar landing research. The announcement, coming at a time of increased tension between the superpowers (and increased tensions between Canada and China), is a hopeful sign of rapprochement and a break from past policy.

As outlined in the January 18th, 2019 CTV News post, "NASA and China collaborate on Moon exploration," NASA has held discussions with the China National Space Administration (CNSA) on the possibility of having its Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) spacecraft observe the landing plume of China’s Chang’e 4 lunar lander on January 31st, 2019.

Also discussed was a proposal for NASA access to Chang’e’4’s orbiter imagery and the placing of a radio beacon on Chang’e 4 to aid future US lunar surface missions by public and private entities. The discussions followed on an exchange earlier this month that saw NASA share location data on the LRO and CNSA sharing the landing time and location of Chang’e’4.

The collaboration requires NASA to observe a strict US legal framework intended to prevent the transfer of US technology to China.

China’s Chang’e 4 mission made an historic landing on the far side of the Moon on January 3rd; the first nation to do so. Chang’e 4 has three components; a communication relay satellite named Queqiao, the Chang’e 4 lander and a rover named Yutu 2. Its mission is to explore the impact crater known as the Aitken Basin, analyzing lunar rocks and soils, measuring surface temperature, performing radio-astronomy, studying cosmic rays and observing the Sun’s corona.

In another lunar first, Chang’e 4 also performed biological experiments; these resulted in the successful sprouting of cottonseed, rapeseed and potato seeds. Chang’e 4’s science payloads were partly supplied by various international partners, including Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia.

As China continues its ascension and US government and industry make their own preparations for a return to the Moon, these cooperative efforts represent a new pragmatism. After years of being excluded from international space projects, China can no longer be ignored.

As the deterioration of the Russian space program continues, a pooling of US and Chinese resources becomes more logical. In the long run, an extended multinational push into space will require cooperation and coordination between all parties to maximize the chances of survival and success.

Despite current superpower jousting, such gestures show a willingness to work toward greater goals. In our current troubled times, this is welcome news indeed.

Brian Orlotti.

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Brian Orlotti is a network operator at the Ontario Research and Innovation Optical Network (ORION), a not-for-profit network service provider to the education and research sectors.

A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions

Part 1: The Axworthy Doctrine

          By Chuck Black

The US plan to create an expanded United States Space Force independent of the other five branches of the US military has slowly been taking form under the current Donald Trump administration, but the genesis of the concept goes back to the 1980's and Ronald Reagan's Star Wars Strategic Defence Initiative. 

Since the new plan will essentially absorb major components of existing North American defence, including the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), there is no question that Canada's current defence policy, as outlined in the January 17th, 2019 Federal government overview, "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy," will need to reconcile existing policies and partnerships with future US intentions. 

As noted in the September 14th, 2017 Canadian Press post, "Policy says US won’t defend Canada from missile attack: Norad general," Canada might even appreciate an opportunity to revisit decisions on whether or not to accept (and assist with the implementation) or reject the new US defence policies. 

For example, the Department of National Defence (DND) Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) program is currently funding the development of over two dozen new applications relating to space situational awareness and other activities which could be either adapted by the US in exchange for access to US space defence capabilities or deployed independently.

Will Canada take advantage of this opportunity to re-assess its integration into the US defensive screen. Below is the first part of a short history of Canadian space defence planning which would suggest that there are certain defence components which Canada might want to carry out independently of the US. 

_________________________________________________________________________________

Lloyd Axworthy in the 1990's. Graphic c/o Graeme Mackay.

To learn about the origins of Canada's military space policy, we need to start with something called the "1994 Canadian White Paper on Defence."

It's a difficult to find the document these days although it was once a well respected and widely disseminated policy paper generated by incoming Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's Liberal government which outlined their plans for the Canadian military.

Called the "Axworthy Doctrine" after incoming Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy (who helped originate and champion many of the ideas in the document), its intent was to provide a justification to scale back military expenditures allocated by the outgoing Conservative government and take advantage of the so called "peace dividend" expected to accrue to western democracies after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980's.

Included among the cuts was Canada's traditional commitment to the "level and tempo of Canada-U.S. defense relations, particularly in NORAD, (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which) has been decreasing since the late 1980s" according to the document "Canada, Getting it Right This Time: The 1994 Defence White Paper" published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the United States Army War College.

Canadian financial contributions to the NATO allied infrastructure program and force levels for the them new CF-18 Hornet fighter jets were also cut back.

But while military cutbacks to Canada's NATO and NORAD contributions might seem like a sane and sensible policy for some, those cutbacks also undermined two of the four traditional pillars of Canadian military policy (the other two are protection of Canadian sovereignty and international peacekeeping missions).

The current NORAD HQ in Building 2 at Peterson Air Force Base. The Cheyenne Mountain Military Complex, the traditional centre of NORAD activities is "no longer used on a daily basis" according to Wikipedia. Photo c/o Wikipedia.

Even worse, the Axworthy Doctrine suggested that direct threats to North American security were unlikely in the foreseeable future. With three of the four traditional justifications for a Canadian military seemingly under fire from an incoming government mandated to slash spending, a new rationale was needed.

This is where the Axworthy Doctrine got creative. It essentially doubled down on the final tier of Canada's military space policy, the international peace missions.

It championed a concept called "human security" which challenged traditional notions of international security by arguing that it should be focused around the individual instead of the state. It also argued that the United Nations (UN) had a "responsibility to protect" people anywhere in the world against genocide and ethnic cleansing attempts, even to the extent of invading or interfering in the internal politics of otherwise sovereign nations.

The 1994 UN mission. Graphic c/o Amazon.

Axworthy (who eventually became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Jean Chrétien government) felt this new Canadian military role could be undertaken by the existing Canadian Forces without the need for any additional military expenditures. In essence, the ruling liberal government could legitimately task the Canadian Forces with the Axworthy Doctrine and still cut military funding.

Was this a great country or what?

To be fair, the doctrine was widely considered to be a reasonable response to help prevent a repeat of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide where the Canadian commander of a UN peace keeping mission (Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire) was prevented from taking steps he felt would diffuse the situation and save lives.

But even in this area, the "Axworthy Doctrine" was a two edge sword. According to the June 9th, 2006 Canadian Encyclopedia post, "Canada's 'responsibility to protect' Doctrine Gaining Ground at the UN," it might:

... sound warm and fuzzy on the surface, but underlying that vision is the cold hard recognition that military intervention may be necessary to achieve this end. Rejecting the sanctity of national borders that has been central to the UN since its founding in 1945, the proposal would create a sort of official licence to invade.

The concept of a "license to invade" rogue regimes for the greater good found an obvious following in the United States (especially after 9/11) which initially provided much of the support infrastructure needed to send Canadian soldiers around the world.

This 2010 political cartoon about "rogue regimes" comes from a simpler age. Graphic c/o Boston Herald.

Unfortunately, the Americans soon started making noise about how Canada should build their own infrastructure, and not simply "piggyback" on existing US capabilities. Axworthy ended up being wrong about his doctrine not needing new expenditures to support combat capable troops on lengthy international missions.

In essence, its not so much different from current US policy requests for allies to pay their "fair share" of military expenditures for communal defence. Some things never change.

Oddly enough, the easiest way to support the Axworthy Doctrine was to develop an indigenous military space communications and surveillance capability to support Canadian missions abroad.

Kinda like what the US is currently looking to leverage as the core components of their proposed US Space Force and quite similar to those two dozen proposals currently being funded by the DND IDEaS program.

The early requirements for this communications and surveillance capability, which led directly to the formulation of Canada's 1998 military space policy, along with a bit of background on why there was no Canadian military space policy prior to 1998, will be the subject of our next post on this topic.

Chuck Black.

___________________________________________________________

Chuck Black is the editor of the Commercial Space blog. 

Portions of  this  multipart overview were originally published in the December 27th, 2010 post, "Canada's Military Space Policy: Part 1, The Axworthy Doctrine."






Next episode: "The Changing Political Landscape," as part two of "A Short History of Canada's Military Space Policy and How it Fits into the Current US Space Force Discussions," continues.